How do societies change as more and more people cease to identify with any religion? And does this shift inevitably mean that religious and non-religious people are drifting further and further apart in terms of social and political views?

Dr. Sarah Wilkins-Laflamme addressed these questions in her keynote address at the World Humanist Congress in Ottawa. Drawing on international data—including findings from the World Values Survey, the European Values Survey, and Canadian longitudinal studies—she examined secularization as a process of social transition that affects different countries and generations in different ways.

It became clear that, on some sociopolitical issues, the views of religious and non-religious people do indeed differ widely. On others, however, the common ground is surprisingly broad.

Secularization occurs in phases

Canada provides a particularly striking example of this shift. In 1911, just 0.4 percent of the population reported having no religious affiliation. By 1971, that figure had risen to 4 percent, and by 2021, it had reached about 35 percent.

Wilkins-Laflamme distinguishes between different phases of social secularization. In an early phase, non-religiousness is a position held by a small minority that may face significant resistance and social pressure. As secularization progresses, a phase of coexistence between religious and non-religious segments of the population follows. In an advanced phase, societal norms may eventually shift: non-religiousness becomes a normal option that no longer needs to be specifically explained or justified.

According to Wilkins-Laflamme, Canada is currently moving toward such an advanced stage. This becomes particularly clear when looking at the generations: Among younger people, more than half now say they do not belong to any religion. Irreligion is thus increasingly being passed down from one generation to the next.

However, this trend is not progressing at the same rate everywhere. Wilkins-Laflamme counts Australia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, France, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands among the most advanced secularized societies. Numerous other societies, on the other hand, are in earlier stages. Secularization is therefore not a process that proceeds simultaneously and uniformly everywhere.

Significant Differences in Self-Determination and Reproductive Rights

Based on this long-term trend, Wilkins-Laflamme raised a question that currently shapes many social debates: To what extent do religious and non-religious people actually differ politically and socially?

The differences are particularly pronounced when it comes to issues of sexual self-determination, gender roles, and reproductive rights: regarding homosexuality and adoption by same-sex couples, abortion, divorce, and euthanasia, as well as perceptions of women’s roles in the family and the workplace.

When comparing the most religious quarter of respondents in the European data—as measured, for example, by belief in God, prayer, and attendance at religious services—with the least religious quarter, clearly different distributions emerge: On average, deeply religious people hold more conservative views, while those who are not very religious or not religious at all tend to hold more progressive views.

At the same time, the data caution against drawing overly simplistic comparisons. The groups overlap: there are progressive religious people just as there are conservative non-religious people. Religiosity is therefore an important factor—but it by no means fully determines sociopolitical attitudes.

The example of abortion illustrates just how significant these differences can be. In Canada, about 40 percent of religious respondents, but 76 percent of non-religious respondents, consider abortion justified under certain or all circumstances. That represents a difference of 36 percentage points.

In the U.S. as well, there is a clear divide between the two groups on this issue. In Mexico, on the other hand, the difference is smaller—though this is also because support for the right to abortion is lower overall there.

Minor Differences in Environment, Migration, and Democracy

On other political issues, the picture was significantly less clear-cut. On environmental protection, for example, about 55 percent of religious respondents in Canada and 66 percent of non-religious respondents favor prioritizing environmental protection over economic growth. A difference does exist, but it is considerably smaller than that seen with regard to reproductive rights.

The differences in attitudes toward immigrants and foreign workers are even smaller. The vast majority of people in both groups have no problem having people with a migrant background as neighbors.

When it comes to the importance of democracy, the differences disappear almost entirely. About three-quarters of both religious and non-religious respondents in Canada consider democracy to be absolutely important. In the U.S., too, the groups are very close in their views. Even in Russia, where overall support for democracy is significantly lower, there is little difference between religious and non-religious people on this issue.

Whether religious and non-religious people differ significantly depends largely on what they are asked.

Not a Divided Society

Wilkins-Laflamme’s findings thus put into perspective the widespread narrative of a society that is drifting further and further apart. Conflicts attract public attention; they make headlines and shape political debates. Less visible, however, are those areas in which social groups share similar views.

There are, in some cases, significant differences—particularly when it comes to self-determination, reproductive rights, gender roles, and LGBTQ+ rights. But that does not mean that religious and non-religious people form two distinct social camps that are at odds with one another on every political issue.

Coexistence is becoming a social reality

This is all the more significant because, for the foreseeable future, most societies will be neither exclusively religious nor exclusively nonreligious. In many countries, secular change is in full swing. But religious population groups will not simply disappear as a result—nor will the growing nonreligious population groups.

Social reality is therefore increasingly one of coexistence: religious and non-religious people live in the same cities, work in the same institutions, and negotiate the same political and social issues together. In some societies, this occurs relatively peacefully; in others, it gives rise to significant conflicts. The crucial question, therefore, is not so much whether these different worldviews will coexist, but rather how this coexistence will be shaped.

What does this mean for humanist “resistance”?

For Wilkins-Laflamme, the empirical analysis leads directly to a key question of the World Congress: What can “resistance” mean under these conditions? Resistance can mean resolutely defending one’s own values and advocating for political change, especially where human rights, individual autonomy, or self-determination are at stake. At the same time, resistance can also mean recognizing those areas in which people with different ideological backgrounds share values and working together on that basis.

At the end of her keynote address, she spoke of “rapprochement”: of coming together and of common ground that exists alongside real differences. Such common ground can foster connections—between non-religious people, but certainly also with people who are firmly rooted in a religious tradition.

For humanist organizations, this presents an interesting strategic perspective: Not every difference must be resolved before cooperation is possible. When it comes to human rights, self-determination, or reproductive rights, clear-cut disputes may be necessary. At the same time, there are areas of society—such as democracy, the environment, or issues of coexistence—in which common ground may be greater than the pervasive narrative of social division would suggest.

Humanist “resistance” can therefore mean two things: setting clear boundaries where fundamental values are at stake—and the ability to form alliances where shared values provide a foundation.

Alliances that transcend ideological boundaries

It is precisely this last insight that makes the keynote address interesting beyond the realm of secularization research alone: It is not the question “religious or nonreligious?” alone that determines who can be a socio-political ally. What we talk about—and what values we share on a specific issue—is also crucial.

For the Humanist Association of Germany, this perspective is also relevant to its own political work: cooperation does not require complete ideological agreement. We form alliances on a case-by-case basis—with those with whom we share common goals and values on a specific issue. This can mean standing up for democracy, human rights, social justice, or against right-wing extremism alongside religious organizations one day, and taking clearly opposing positions the next day on issues such as self-determination, the relationship between state and religion, or reproductive rights.

At the World Congress, Prof. Ralf Schöppner also emphasized the distinction between “opponents” and “enemies” —between political or ideological opponents and those who attack the very foundations of the democratic order. Not every fundamental difference of opinion turns the other person into an enemy. A democratic society must also be able to withstand sharp dissent without abandoning the shared political space.

For the Humanist Association of Germany, this implies that wherever human rights and individual self-determination are at stake, clear criticism remains necessary. At the same time, ideological differences should not cause us to lose sight of potential allies. What is crucial is to recognize shared values and goals in specific political issues and to develop a shared capacity for action based on them.

About the Author: Dr. Sarah Wilkins-Laflamme is an associate professor of sociology at the University of Waterloo in Canada. A sociologist who earned her Ph.D. from the University of Oxford, she focuses her research on secularization, non-religiosity, and non-belief, as well as on the relationship between religion, social attitudes, and social change. A particular focus of her work is on the differences and similarities between religious and non-religious population groups in Western societies.